Conservation incentives agreements and avoided deforestation crediting scheme : the challenge of implementation by Karsenty, Alain & Pirard, Romain
1Conservation Incentives
Agreements and « Avoided
Deforestation » crediting scheme
The challenge of implementation
Alain KARSENTY,
CIRAD, France
Romain PIRARD
Post-Doc, Auvergne University (France)
2PES oriented toward carbon sequestration or direct
acquisition of biodiversity
Various schemes : Clean Development Mechanism –
CDM (carbon sequestration), Conservation Easements -
CE (payment of the owner for conservation on his
property), Transferable Development Rights - TDRs
(exchange of development/deforestation rights),
Conservation Concessions – CC (buying back of
development rights on public lands).
Difference of nature and scale:
? CDM as carbon projects to foster plantations initiatives,
? CE as a contract on private lands,
? TDRs as a market mechanism to reach a cross-properties
conservation compulsory target (e.g. 20 or 50% of rural property
land remaining under forest cover) at lower opportunity cost.
? Conservation concessions (CCs) can be viewed at local scale
(pay farmers to cap their land development in order to protect
biodiversity of environmental service ) but also at a larger scale
(global alternative to logging in tropical forest areas of “high
conservation value”): the “logging off” ultimate instrument (cf.
Gulllison et al., 2001).
3Nature of the instruments
CDM is a project-based development instrument, whose risks are
not very specific (leakage, additionality, reversibility) and can be
evaluated with the classical evaluation toolbox (i.e. impacts,
financial and economic…).
? But high transaction costs practically prohibit CDM implementation for
small-scale plantation (community-based, etc.) and additionality
condition has lead to the exclusion of industrial plantations.
? Less of 0.5% of CDM projects registered by UNFCCC are forestry
projects for carbon sequestration
CE is a bilateral contract for privately owned-land, whether it is
individual or common property (providing resolved the issue of who
will be entitled to receive money).
? But control costs are likely to be high in some situations (moral hazard,
heterogeneity of the “community” impeding social control)
TDRs is a voluntary exchange of rights mechanism on private lands
under an exogenous (law) constraint.
? But possible doubts on enforcement capacities (moral hazard), and
additionality (will the seller would have effectively developed his land
otherwise?)
4The case of Conservation Concessions
Designed to work on public lands, and biodiversity-rich forests
Based on a compensatory principle over time: local populations,
Government, Forest industry
Different scale and cases:
? CCs on primary forests (generally too expensive)
? CCs on logged-over forest: economic logging rent has gone, thus price
is affordable (“second best”): buying back logging rights after the initial
selective cut (as done generally in the tropics), then preserve (as long
as funding is available)
? CCs on customary-owned lands
Founded on a harsh criticism of SFM (Rice et al., 2001), rebutted by
Pearce, Putz & Vanclay (2003)
A small-scale or large-scale objective?
According to our understanding, in moist and dense tropical forest
(which one is not biodiversity-rich?), the only limiting factor would be
the money available for the purchasing of logging rights (the
“logging-off” objective). It is a global alternative to SFM strategies
endorsed by many governments (cf. Congo Basin)
5Large-scale Conservation Concessions : a fair deal?
? How to evaluate compensation ?
? Evaluate the foregone revenues from giving up “forest
development” (i.e. logging and the associated
industry): what is the “opportunity cost”?
? Not only foregone taxes, but lost (or non-created)
jobs, and indirect economic opportunities lost by the
change in land use (transportation, small-scale
activities…). How to compensate this? To whom the
“conservation investor” should give the money?
? Highly variable price according to existing
institutional arrangements: logging taxes in Cameroon
(set by competitive bidding), and average wages are
at least 5 to 6 times higher than in Guyana, where CI
has negotiated a CC with the Government
6The Ngoïla-Mintom (Cameroon) case
A 830,000 ha of primary-like forest, once earmarked as
« production forests » by the 1995 zoning plan (baseline
scenario)
A key area for making a large continuous conservation
area crossing 3 countries
NGO’s and donors pressure on the GoC to consider a
conservation concession alternative
Unallocated by the GoC, still looking for financial
compensation proposals from ‘the international
community”
The opportunity cost of the conservation scenario has
been estimated at US $18.85 ha/year (potential raw
benefits from conservation scheme included) (Karsenty,
2007)
Very far from the $1 ha/year suggested by Hardner and
Rice (2002)
7The trouble with large-scale
Conservation Concessions
? Are CC feasible only in countries were
discretionary allocation of concession and
patronage is dominating, but unfeasible under
the rule of transparent competitive allocation?
? It is not unfair to guess that the Conservation
organizations interest is to purchase
development rights at the lowest possible
(bargain) price to expand the area under
conservation. But does it match local
aspirations of people and national interest?
8Why “conservation rights” are cheaper in
poorest countries?
According to Ferraro and Kiss (2002), annual payments
for conservation range from US$39/ha in the UK, $9.9 in
Tanzania and $1.25 in Guyana, despite the biodiversity
richness is likely to be ranked conversely
Low “opportunity cost” is due to few development
opportunities. It is likely that stakeholders readily sell
their development rights at cheap price (high private
discount rate)
Opportunity costs is, by far, higher along the soy bean
agricultural front in Brazilian Amazon or in a
Kalimantan’s logged-over forests about to be converted
in oil palm plantations; i.e. where forest liquidation is a
real threat (a quite more serious threat on biodiversity
than SFM and shifting cultivation in low population
density area)
9Compensating at current poverty levels?
Conservation rents to be served to the “sellers of rights”
are likely to be “cheap” rents, indexed on the current
poverty level of stakeholders (Government,
communities), with the implicit assumption that their only
projected future is of economic stagnation (thinking
about Africa...).
Likely to be the baseline used by the “conservation
investor” to negotiate compensation levels
Non-farm employments potentially provided by the
conservation initiative (craftsman, eco-guards, etc.) are
unlikely to replace lost (or non-created) logging,
industrial and service jobs (wood-processing,
transportation, by-products trade…)
10
Is Avoided deforestation scheme
the solution?
Reduced Emissions from Deforestation in
Developing countries : a scheme, with
variations, proposed by PNG, Brazil and other
countries
Deforestation: 20 to 25% of CO2 emissions
Avoiding deforestation: would save carbon and
biodiversity
The bottom line: financial rewards for countries
reducing their deforestation rate, with carbon
credits (Kyoto assets) or money equivalent
(special fund to be set up)
How to assess the reduction?
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Seeing the past or the future?
Most of the proposals suggests derive the baseline from
an average of past trends
Problem: how to deal with “environmental Kuznet curve”
and changes in both the remaining forest resource stock
and the degree of reliance on natural resources
Indonesia and Malaysia have contemplated huge rate of
deforestation in the 80 and 90’s, but the forest cover
tend now to concentrate in highlands, beyond the forest
economic frontier: lower trend of deforestation for
mechanical reason.
Would it be “fair” to reward Indonesia and Malaysia with
regard to their past policies vis-à-vis the forest in the
past decades?
Central Africa recorded relatively low levels due to lack
of investment in alternative land use; but if these
countries enjoy higher development rates, their
deforestation rates are likely to increase
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Is prediction feasible?
The alternative solution is to anticipate a likely “business
as usual” deforestation rate on a coming period
Chomitz et al.(2007) are suggesting modeling land-use
dynamics to calculate the baseline scenario. They
pointed out a correlation between deforestation rate in
Amazon and beef price at farm gate. They also see a
correlation with rainfalls…
Difference to make between (quite) predictable variables
(e.g. population growth) and guesses: who can predict
often speculative prices for major agriculture
commodities, such as soy, oil palm, beef….? Who can
predict the evolution of rainfalls quantities and the risk of
forest fires in context of growing climate disorders?
No risk of national pressures on experts work to
“worsened” the baseline?
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An overestimation of government’s’
role and capacities
Most of the factors influencing deforestation variation
rates are beyond the reach of the governments (i.e. cash
crop commodities prices,
In a complex system, measuring the impact of given
public actions in terms of how many hectares are (not)
deforested constitutes a genuine challenge: Kaimowitz
and Angelsen (1999) have shown the uncertain effects
of single variables (such as agricultural progress) on
deforestation
If deforestation is reduced, how to separate the effect of
public policies and the other factors which occurred
independently of the government will?
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Refinements do not overcome the basic
difficulty of fixing what factor is responsible
for less deforestation
Schlamadinger’s proposal: a window of anticipated
deforestation rates rather than a single rate number
Slipping (or dynamic) baselines: probably more
satisfying, but the governments will not have visibility on
their “corrected target”. Likely “negotiated targets” rather
than computed baselines
Several developed countries are against ex-ante
baselines as they fear some tropical countries would
behave strategically, increasing their deforestation
before the commitment period to degrade their
baselines.
Another difficulty: would governments credited in
commitment period # 1 be asked to reimburse the
financial assets in case the deforestation rate jump in
period # 2?
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Overlooking the political economy
of deforestation ?
Public policies often do favor deforestation, when they
are backed by some social and economic forces (i.e.
paper pulp and oil palm producers in Indonesia and
Malaysia, cocoa “planteurs” in Côte d’Ivoire, soy agro-
businessmen in Brazil…)
Will governments reverse their social alliances for the
benefit of carbon credits whose prices are volatile (see
EU’ market current situation) and which will be paid
several years after the public actions?
Example of land tenure: Governments have a real
economic interest, at present, to secure land rights, but
most of them don’t adopt policies aiming at that.
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A new source of “hot air”?
Two risks :
?  (i) some countries might be rewarded for
lower deforestation rates that are due to
external reasons (e.g., a drop in soy market
prices or higher rainfall). A typical issue of
additionality, then of efficiency.
? (ii) possible real voluntary efforts would not be
rewarded due to the adverse impact of
external factors. A typical issue of equity.
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Working with countries to remove
“perverse incentives”
Enhancing existing tools (World Bank “conditions”, FLEG
program, international negotiations…)  for suppressing
obvious "perverse incentives” such as incentives for
overinvestment in the timber and paper industry, land
tenure that favours only agricultural activities, taxation
systems that lead to the degradation and conversion of
natural forests, weak governance with poor law
enforcement…
Helping developing countries to resolve the land tenure
issue (insecure or unrecognized land and resource
rights, seems more urgent and promising on a long term
perspective
Helping countries to move faster along their “Kuznet
environmental curve” with mutually agreed sustainable
development paths.
